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FOREWORD

This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the
past by way of establishing how much the conﬂict in Iraq conforms
to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and
contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as
those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and
Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from
British, French, and Israeli experience.
The monograph was delivered by invitation at the 15th Annual
Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army War College in April 2004. It
derived from work undertaken while the author was occupying the
Major General Matthew C. Horner Chair of Military Theory at the
U.S. Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this contribution
to the debate on insurgencies, past and present.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INSURGENCY IN IRAQ:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Guerrilla warfare in one form or another was certainly the most
prevalent type of conﬂict in the 20th century, if not before. For
instance, British soldiers died on active service somewhere in the
world in every year between 1945 and 1997, with the exception of
1968. Yet, the conventional warﬁghting experience was conﬁned to
35 months of the Korean War, 10 days at Suez in 1956, 25 days of
the land campaign of the Falklands in 1982, and 100 hours of land
operations in the Gulf in 1991: everything else was some kind of lowintensity conﬂict. Much the same was true of other major armies.
The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests
that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either
of achieving power and inﬂuence, or of bringing a cause to the notice
of an international or national community. The end of European
decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed
the motivational impulse for much conﬂict between the late 1940s
and the late 1980s. However, arguably new ideological, political,
and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conﬂict
and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar
political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many
more nonstate actors. Indeed, between 1990 and 1996 alone, there
were at least 98 conﬂicts worldwide, but only 7 of these were waged
between recognized states.1
Various instances of contemporary insurgency have been
categorized by different analysts in such terms as apolitical,
primordial, traditionalist, pluralist, reformist, spiritual, separatist,
and economic.2 Certainly Islamic fundamentalism, which might be
regarded more as an ideology than an expressly religious conviction,
has emerged as a new imperative behind insurgency. Examples range
from the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan between 1979
and 1989 to the continuing conﬂicts in the Philippines, Indonesia,
Palestine, Algeria, the Sudan, Kashmir, Chad, and, of course, Iraq,
although some of these conﬂicts may also be characterized in other
terms such as ethnic or separatist insurgencies.
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Notwithstanding new motivational impulses, however, and that
insurgents increasingly are better armed, perhaps more fanatical,
and, in some cases, better attuned to the information revolution than
in the past, much remains the same in terms of the basic requirements
for successful insurgency. Insurgency is still a highly political act
arising from some sense of grievance, or upon the exploitation and
manipulation of grievance. An insurgent leadership remains likely to
be motivated better than the rank and ﬁle. Insurgency will still be the
recourse of those initially weaker than their opponents and, although
perhaps less protracted than in the past, its ultimate success may still
largely depend on substantial external support. Above all, however,
insurgency remains invariably a competition in government and in
perceptions of legitimacy.
Insurgency or Guerrilla Warfare?
What, then, of the patterns of insurgency in Iraq, and how do they
differ from, or compare with, the past? One fundamental question is
whether what is being faced in Iraq is insurgency or terrorism, or
perhaps merely a traditional form of guerrilla warfare or resistance.
Prior to the 20th century, guerrilla warfare was understood as a
purely military form of conﬂict―classic hit and run tactics employed
by indigenous groups in opposition to foreign or colonial occupation
where a conventional army either had been defeated or had never
existed. Rarely did such guerrillas display any wider comprehension
of the potential of irregular modes of conﬂict. Only in the 1930s and
1940s did guerrilla warfare became truly revolutionary in both intent
and practice, with social, economic, psychological, and, especially,
political elements grafted onto traditional irregular military tactics
in order to radically alter the structure of a state by force. Thus,
dissident groups that were initially in a minority and weaker than the
authorities would seek power through a combination of subversion,
propaganda, and military action. More properly, therefore, modern
revolutionary guerrilla warfare was increasingly termed insurgency,
guerrilla tactics being employed strategically to achieve a particular
political and/or ideological end.
The transition from guerrilla warfare to insurgency does not
depend, therefore, upon the size of any particular group, but upon
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the intention to bring about fundamental political change through
a political-military strategy of organized coercion and subversion,
and, usually, also the attempt to mobilize a mass political base. While
insurgents routinely might employ terror or intimidation in tactical
terms, they have rarely done so at the strategic level. Consequently,
perhaps it can be argued that terrorist groups, even if motivated
by a similar ideology to insurgent groups, have tended to employ
terrorism indiscriminately and as political symbolism without the
same intention of taking over the state apparatus themselves and
without any attempt to mobilize popular support.
Insurgency also implies an attempt to establish a political
infrastructure based on some form of mass organization in order to
cultivate popular support. There have been cases in which insurgents
attempted to bypass the lengthy political preparation of a population
recommended by Mao and by those who have espoused a broadly
Maoist model of insurgency, and thus follow a shorter route to
power. The most obvious examples are the rural focos inspired by
Guevara and Debray in Latin America in the mid 1960s as a result of
a ﬂawed interpretation of the unique combination of circumstances
that enabled Castro to succeed in Cuba between 1956 and 1959. In
the same way, the belief in the ability of a small insurgent elite to
exploit a minimum level of discontent and act as a catalyst for wider
popular insurrection without consciously building a mass political
support organization characterized the approach of the urban
guerrilla groups inspired by theorists such as Marighela and Guillen
in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, none
of these groups succeeded. The Maoist model itself has not always
been successful. It failed in Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Peru, in the latter after 17 years of preparation before the Shining Path
actually launched its declaration of a “people’s war” in May 1980.
It follows, however, that those insurgencies that ultimately have
been successful have been those capable of organizing a sufﬁciently
durable political infrastructure to sustain a prolonged conﬂict.
The utility of the ability to prolong insurgency is equally
applicable to either offensive or defensive insurgency, the former
implying the seizure of power in a state, and the latter the expulsion
of an invading or occupying force, or secession. One reason for the
prolongation of conﬂict in the Maoist model of insurgency was that
3

the ultimate aim was always to build a conventional army capable of
undertaking large scale military operations in a third, mobile phase
of war, following the two earlier essentially political phases of the
conﬂict. Building a conventional army, as did Mao and the North
Vietnamese, however, has not always been essential to success when
the aim of prolongation has been to raise the military and political
costs for the incumbent authorities. Indeed, in many respects, for
the insurgent, survival is winning. It also always has been possible
to wage an effective urban campaign with far fewer insurgents
than a rural campaign, but urban insurgencies have always proved
vulnerable in the past.
The situation that has developed since President George W.
Bush declared Operation IRAQI FREEDOM at an end on May 1,
2003, is a complex one. Among the Sunnis, a variety of groups have
been identiﬁed. They are united only in the sense of having what
have been called “negative” goals in opposition to U.S. presence; in
seeking some return to the former status quo in which the Sunni
minority have exercised power since the Ottoman period; or
expressing a simple nationalist reaction to defeat.3 Some are clearly
restorationist groups drawn from the former regime, the Baa’th
Party, the paramilitary Fida’iyn, and the Republican Guard. Some
are anti-Saddam nationalist groups with no desire to see Saddam
restored but resentful of U.S. and Western presence; others are
Islamist groups, some members of which have been trained overseas
or are foreign nationals, the latter including Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis,
and Sudanese. Some activities have been the work of criminals or
criminal organizations, large numbers of criminals being released
at the end of the war and some certainly hiring themselves out for
attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces. Indeed, the U.S. 4th Division’s
Taskforce Ironhorse reported in November 2003 that between 70 and
80 percent of those apprehended for making attacks in their area
were paid to do so, the going rate being anything between $150 and
$500.4
Most armed opposition has been Sunni. Some leading Sunni
parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi Islamic Party
apparently have resolved to engage in legitimate political activities,
but Sunni clerics have largely condemned the Coalition presence.
By contrast, although the Coalition presence is the principal barrier
4

between the Shi’ites and the power denied them for so long, many
Shi’ite clerics have mostly condemned the failures to restore law and
order, having perhaps calculated that Sunni insurgency currently
lacks the ability to transform itself into anything resembling a national
movement. However, there are armed militias attached to the two
main Shi’ite political parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq and Al-Da’wa, and there is clearly potential for
Shi’ite participation in violence. Indeed, since April 2004, the militia
of Muqtada al-Sadr, the so-called Mahdi’s Army, has engaged in
signiﬁcant violence after the closure of his weekly newspaper by
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the arrest of his
deputy. Former exiled groups such as the Iraqi National Congress
and the Iraqi National Accord also maintain militias. Another armed
factor in the equation is the Kurds, but they are highly unlikely to
participate in any anti-Coalition insurgency. The situation is made
still more complex by the tribal nature of Iraq, with its extended
clan and kinship system, the CPA having recognized the problem
by establishing an advisory Council of Tribal Sheikhs.5 It has been
suggested on the basis of a letter seized in January 2004 that there
is an Al-Qa’eda plan to foment civil war in Iraq by attacking the
Shi’ite majority, but the document also implies frustration at Iraq
not proving fertile ground for jihad and foreign holy warriors.6 The
number of foreign activists in Iraq thus far appears small.
Divisions within Iraqi society, of course, have always been of
major signiﬁcance. Indeed, as Gertrude Bell observed during the
Iraqi insurrection against British control in 1920, while all groups
were equally nationalist and espoused the idea of an Islamic
government, the revolt meant different things to different people.
Thus, Shi’ites anticipated a theocratic state under Shariah law;
Sunnis, an independent Arab state under Amir Abdullah; and “to the
tribes, it meant no government at all.” Interestingly, even as astute
an observer as Bell believed the revolt largely a result of external
agitation by the Bolsheviks and the Turks. The British prevailed in
the end partly by buying off some of the tribal leaders.7
Therefore, although elements required for an insurgency exist
in Iraq, including some early U.S. and Coalition errors, widespread
resentment and alienation, “occupation fatigue,” and even cash
and arms, there is not yet the cohesive leadership, political vision,
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strategic direction, or unifying ideology to suggest the emergence of
a real insurgency. It is generally easier to mobilize mass support in a
defensive rather than an offensive insurgency since occupation, for
example, may prompt a fundamentally different reaction on the part
of the population to insurgents playing a nationalist card. Clausewitz
argued that national character shaped the suitability of a population
for waging people’s war and, although this is too deterministic, the
nature of a particular state and its population is of considerable
signiﬁcance. Some insurgencies, however, may simply lack the ability
to progress to a wider base of support where they represent narrow
sectional interests as in conﬂicts based upon separatism or ethnicity.
It is evident that mosques do provide some basis for the organization
that is beginning to emerge among the Sunnis, but a wider sense of
alienation among the majority of Shi’ites sufﬁcient to forge a more
national response in opposition to the Coalition presence would be
required to generate a centralized resistance movement.8 Indeed,
in November 2003 Paul Bremer indicated there was still no reliable
information on the size and structure of the various groups carrying
out attacks or their leadership. In February 2004, however, the U.S.
military released a list of 32 suspects believed to be involved in
organizing the insurgency, headed by Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad,
a former Ba’ath ofﬁcial for whom a reward of $1 million was offered.
Rewards of $200,000 were offered for the next top 10 names on the
list, all being former regime military or party ﬁgures.
The situation in Iraq has been characterized as perhaps an example
of a “net war,” in which loose groups often diametrically opposed to
one another gravitate towards one another to carry out attacks, trade
weapons or intelligence, and disperse, never to cooperate again.
Equally, the British army has tended to view its own role in Basra
as an extension of the “twofold war” of conventional operations
concomitant with internal security operations it experienced in ﬁrst
taking control of the city in March 2003. Neither suggests insurgency
in the sense usually understood since 1945.9
Parallels with the Past: The Insurgent Challenge.
The absence of a real insurgency, however, does not make
the situation less dangerous, and whatever the motivation of any
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particular group, the aim is clearly to sow divisions both between
the Iraqis and the Coalition and also among Iraqis themselves. It is
also to raise the costs of U.S. and Western presence since there can
be little expectation on the part of these various groups that they are
capable of challenging the Coalition’s military superiority. Indeed,
far from reading Black Hawk Down as Saddam apparently suggested
to his followers, it seems more likely opponents of the United States
in Iraq have read Menachem Begin’s The Revolt. Begin’s intent,
when leading the Irgun campaign in Palestine between 1945 and
1947, was to raise the political and military costs of the continued
British presence sufﬁciently to persuade them to quit, especially as
he was convinced that the British could never seriously contemplate
outright suppression. Indeed, the self-imposed restraint of the British
response has been likened to that of “a police state with a conscience,”
the choice between total repression and total withdrawal forcing the
British to turn over the Palestine problem to the United Nations (UN)
in September 1947.10 The elements of Begin’s campaign and that of
the other Jewish insurgent group, Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for
the Freedom of Israel or LEHI), more popularly known as the Stern
Gang, are instructive. Over 58 percent of all attacks were directed
at British military and police personnel, LEHI favoring taxi or truck
bombs and the Irgun road mines. In all, just under two-thirds of
attacks were with mines, and just under a quarter with bombs. Some
attacks, such as that on the headquarters of the British Mandate
secretariat in the King David Hotel in Jersualem in July 1946, or on
the Haifa police headquarters in September 1947, were particularly
spectacular. Subsidiary attacks were mounted against economic
targets, with the railways attracting 18 percent of all attacks. The
campaign was exported brieﬂy, with the bombing of the British
embassy in Rome and attacks on British servicemen in Germany and
Austria, while there was a highly effective insurgent propaganda
campaign, and any British measures against the insurgents were
invariably followed by speciﬁc reprisals.11
The pattern of Iraqi activity thus far looks remarkably similar to
that in Palestine with roadside bombs, which have also been used
by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other so-called improvised explosive
devices; ambushes of soft-skinned vehicles; opportunistic rocketpropelled grenade and shooting attacks on military personnel;
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attacks on civilian members of the Coalition authorities and foreign
personnel working in some way for the Coalition; attacks on Iraqi
“collaborators,” most recently police and army recruits; and attacks
on economic targets such as power stations, oil installations, and
pipelines. There has also been an increase in the number of attacks
upon “soft” targets, principally civilian gatherings. This does not
reﬂect the tactics employed in Palestine during the Mandate but does
reﬂect insurgencies elsewhere and an increasing conﬂuence between
insurgent and terrorist methods.
An analysis of the U.S. fatality reports produced by U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) from May 2003 to March 2004 indicates that
30.8 percent of U.S. fatalities were the result of bombs or improvised
explosive devices; 14.3 percent, the result of stand off weapons in
terms of rocket-propelled grenades and mortars; and 10.5 percent,
the result of small arms or grenades. Downed helicopters accounted
for 13.1 percent of fatalities, with the remaining 30.6 percent the
result of accidents of varying kinds and other nonhostile causes. It
is likely that the proportion of deaths due to small arms increased
substantially with the outbreak of greater violence in April 2004,
but, as the communiqués relating to U.S. Marine Corps deaths are
no longer made speciﬁc for operational reasons, the calculation has
become more difﬁcult.
While many of the early attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq were
amateur in nature, there has been a growing sophistication, and also
an increasing tendency as reported by the U.S. 2nd and 4th Divisions,
towards more long-range attacks, with riﬂe-propelled grenades being
supplemented by rocket and mortar attacks, often from improvised
launchers.12 In Aden between 1965 and 1967, there was a cognate
transition from amateur attacks in which insurgents often blew
themselves up―in one early attack the insurgent threw the pin rather
than the grenade―to more effective and more numerous incidents.
Incidents thus rose from 286 in 1965, to 540 in 1966, and to 2,900 in
1967, with grenades, road mines, and sniping taking most British
lives. Similarly, a transition from short-range to long-range attacks
is reminiscent of the increasing preference of the insurgents in the
Dhofar province of Oman between 1965 and 1975 in shifting from
short-range ambush to long-range bombardment, enabling them to
withdraw more quickly. A general assumption appears to be that the
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suicide bombings so familiar from the Palestinian Intifada, though
also from the Shi’ite campaign against the Israelis in Lebanon, are
more likely to be the work of foreign elements than Iraqis.13
It might be noted in terms of installations that a particular feature
of the Iraqi revolt in 1920 was an attack on the railway system, which
was the principal means of mobility for a British garrison short of
both manpower and any other means of reacting quickly to events
beyond possessing a few armored cars and aircraft. Indeed, the British
subsequently advanced along the tracks, repairing as they went and
establishing the kind of blockhouses to guard them reminiscent of
the South African War. Rather similarly, blockhouses and other
physical barriers such as wiring the Trans-Jordanian frontier were
utilized by the British in response to the “Arab Revolt” in Palestine
between 1936 and 1939, along with a “village occupation” policy and
intensive patrolling.14
As a pre-World War II movement, the “Arab Revolt” was
essentially an old-fashioned guerrilla war against the British, lacking
much of the political sophistication associated with the genuine
insurgencies faced by the British in Palestine after the war and
later in Aden. There was certainly a higher guerrilla organization
centered in the Arab High Committee led by the Mufti of Jerusalem,
a degree of coordination in attacks on Jewish settlements and upon
pipelines and railways, and wide support for the guerrillas in terms
of the provision of food, shelter, and recruits in the villages, hence
the British adoption of the village occupation policy. The heightened
British response in 1938, however, led to a rapid decline in the level
of violence, stiﬂing any escalation of the situation into an insurgency.
In some respects, therefore, the situation in Iraq parallels the events
in Palestine in 1936 and 1937, especially as a Jewish population,
convinced that the British could not defend their settlements, began
to take the law into their own hands, deploying their own military
units. By contrast, although the pattern of military activity by the
Irgun in 1945-47, and by the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the
smaller Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)
in the case of Aden, are entirely similar to that in Iraq since 2003, the
Irgun and the Marxist NLF had a far higher degree of organization
than anything yet experienced in Iraq. Moreover, the aims and
ideologies were abundantly clear. While not obviously a Middle
9

Eastern insurgency, the campaign of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion
Agoniston (EOKA) against the British on Cyprus between 1955 and
1959 also is remarkably similar to that of the Irgun, albeit that the
aim was not independence but union with Greece.
Parallels with the Past: Counterinsurgent Response.
In terms of the response to the situation in Iraq, there are
clearly some experiences of Arab or Islamic insurgency that sound
appropriate warning notes. The French experience in Algeria
between 1956 and 1962, for example, has some similarities, albeit that
the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) was largely secular in
character. There were clear divisions between Arabs and Berbers
within the nationalist movement, and popular support, or rather
acquiescence on the part of the population, was ensured through
terror and intimidation rather than the FLN projecting a coherent
alternative social and political order. Indeed, there was something of
a civil war between Muslims, some 180,000 of whom fought for the
French. The French, however, largely failed to capitalize on divisions
among their opponents, and made errors in decapitating a relatively
moderate internal Muslim political party in 1954, the Movement
for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), and the external
moderate leadership of the FLN by forcing down Ahmed Ben
Bell’s aircraft inside Algeria in October 1956. Moreover, the French
squandered the advantage of their long-term familiarity with Algeria
and its peoples by declining to consider a future for Algeria other
than as a part of metropolitan France and not seriously addressing
Muslim political and socio-economic grievances. The ability of the
FLN to ﬁnd refuge across international frontiers was largely nulliﬁed
by the construction of physical barriers along the Moroccan and
Tunisian frontiers, and French military operations were generally
successful in both urban and rural areas. But in almost every respect,
the attempt to win hearts and minds failed because it was carried out
in ways that alienated, rather than won, support
Apart from being very thinly spread, the French Special
Administrative Sections and Urban Administrative Sections tasked
with winning hearts and minds were not always sensitive to local
customs, tended to view the Muslim population as vulnerable to FLN
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contagion, and too readily confused acquiescence with acceptance
of the imposition of an alien culture. Moreover, winning hearts
and minds sat uneasily with large-scale resettlement, the deliberate
fostering of an internal refugee problem, and the brutal methods
utilized to win the Battle of Algiers in 1957, in which intelligence
was gained primarily through systematic torture of detainees. In
the process, there was increasing international criticism of France,
increasing domestic opposition to the war in France itself, and
damaging politicization of the army.15
Israeli counterinsurgency methods are also to be avoided; the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) taking a heavy-handed approach and, in
keeping with its offensive conventional doctrine, regarding instant
retaliation as a means of destroying those responsible for attacks
and of longer-term attrition of the insurgent threat. There has also
been targeting of speciﬁc individuals since 1992 in the belief that
the removal of key members of the opposing infrastructure will
paralyze opponents and give full rein to internal rivalries among
those seeking to succeed to the leadership. It has to be said, however,
that the systematic elimination of leaders of groups like Hamas and
Hezbollah has not diminished markedly the incidence of attacks and
seemingly serves to provoke further hostility to the Israelis not only
among the Shi’ites of southern Lebanon, but among the Palestinians
in Gaza and the West Bank. If anything, what is sometimes called
deterrence by punishment has entrenched anti-Israeli opinion.16
It can also be noted that the South Lebanese Army (SLA), formed
originally in 1978 and used by the Israelis in the security zone of
southern Lebanon from 1982 onwards to man check points and border
fortiﬁcations and to undertake some motorized patrolling, was not
a success. It not only lacked sufﬁcient training but also was seen
as Israeli puppet. The perception was compounded by the Israelis
themselves viewing the SLA as mercenary auxiliaries. Defections
from it increased markedly after 1995, and the Israelis abandoned
it when they withdrew from Lebanon in 2000.17 As the issue of the
SLA raises the question of a constabulary or border force, it is at
least possible that the intended revival by the U.S. Marine Corps of
a Combined Action Program (CAP) may yield considerable beneﬁts,
the CAP scheme as applied in Vietnam being itself something of
a legacy of Marine cooperation with U.S.-raised gendarmerie in
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campaigns such as those in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic in the 1920s and early 1930s.18
In terms of the British responses to insurgency in the Middle
East, the army’s offensive operations in Palestine usually consisted
of cordon and search, over 170 such operations being mounted at
battalion or brigade level, but with 25 percent bringing no results
at all and only exposing troops to false accusations of brutality
or looting. Moreover, although the British eventually deployed
90,000 men, large numbers had to be used solely to guard static
installations such as the railways and the oil pipelines. Two largescale operations were held. Operation AGATHA between June and
July 1946 involved 10,000 troops in a search of three cities and over
30 settlements. Operation SHARK in July and August that same year
employed 21,000 troops in imposing a 36-hour curfew on Tel Aviv’s
population of 170,000 and netting 787 suspects although Begin
escaped by hiding in a secret compartment for 4 days.19
Aden was a similar failure for the British but largely as a result
of the premature announcement by the Labour government in
1966 of its intention to leave South Arabia, undermining at a stroke
the authorities of the Federation of South Arabia and the whole
counterinsurgency effort. Increasingly, indeed, federal ofﬁcials and
even local governments in the emirates, sultanates, and sheikhdoms
either left the country altogether or threw in their lot with the
insurgent movements. In any case, intelligence had never been
forthcoming freely from the population, and there was now little
incentive to cooperate. Arab members of the Special Branch already
had been targeted by the insurgents, and the local police forces were
thoroughly inﬁltrated, both the South Arabian Police and Aden
Armed Police mutinying in one particularly notorious incident in
June 1967, killing 22 British servicemen and taking control of the
Crater district of Aden for 15 days until order was restored.20
The Dhofar campaign, however, was a major success, the Omani
response being guided by a British Army Training Team (BATT)
drawn from the Special Air Service and by various seconded or
contracted British ofﬁcers. Imperial Iranian and Jordanian forces
also arrived to assist in 1973 and 1974, respectively. After 2 years
in which the war was effectively being lost, within 24 hours of the
assumption of power by Sultan Qaboos in July 1970, a substantial
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political and socio-economic plan for the regeneration of the
previously neglected Dhofar province was announced. The Dhofar
Development Committee supervised the expenditure of £218
million between 1971 and 1975 and also acted as the coordinating
body of the civil-military effort at provincial level. Spearheading the
coordinated effort on the jebel were the Civil Action Teams. They
established centers, dug wells as a focus for a nomadic population,
and introduced educational and medical facilities, as well as effecting
longer-term improvements in cattle stocks and market opportunities
for local goods. The process, however, was greatly assisted by the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf
(PFLOAG) insurgents who were Marxists and attempted to impose
an ideology that was anathema to the two fundamental principles of
jebali life, namely Islam and the tribal system. Indeed, it led directly
to defections from PFLOAG, these defectors becoming the nucleus of
the pseudo units known as ﬁrqat. An effective propaganda campaign
built on the slogan, “Islam is our Way, Freedom is our Aim,” and
the establishment of successive physical barriers across PFLOAG
inﬁltration routes from Yemen completed the process of separating
insurgents from a population that increasingly had a vested interest
in the status quo.21
While the Dhofar represents very much a model campaign in an
Islamic country, the problem was of a far lesser magnitude to that
existing in Iraq. Indeed, the sheer scale of the reconstruction required
in Iraq following so many years with a decaying infrastructure and
a repressive regime, in which survival depended upon maintaining
a low proﬁle, is immense. There has been no such reconstruction
and nation-building problem since the reintegration of Germany
and Japan into the international community after World War II: in
neither of those cases, however, was there an insurgency. Perhaps
Reconstruction after the American Civil War is a better analogy,
but if some political and other problems are similar, there is little
comparison between the mid-19th century and the 21st century
in terms of expectations of social and economic requirements for
modern life.22
“Economic and Quality of Life Indicators” in Iraq drawn up
by the Brookings Institution, for example, deal in such matters as
improvements in the output of megawatts of electricity; millions of
13

barrels of oil and millions of litres of diesel, kerosene, gasoline, and
potable water produced each day; the child immunization rate; and
crime and unemployment rates. In the case of the U.S. 4th Division’s
Taskforce Ironhorse, there were 2,012 civic action projects underway
in November 2003, with 1,063 having already been completed, yet
only $18.4 million of $139.8 million worth of projects had been
spent. In the area of the Polish-led International Division, a key
focus was creating 67,000 jobs as part of the overall target by the
Coalition Provisional Authority of creating 300,000 jobs. It is also
intended to raise 40,000 men for the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps by
April 2004, and 71,000 policemen and 40,000 men for the new army
by July 2004.23 The scale of the military effort is also considerable.
The U.S. 4th Division’s Taskforce Ironhorse, for example, undertook
ﬁve successive operational phases between June 8-November 6,
2003, of which Operation IVY NEEDLE from August 11-September
9 alone involved 182 raids, 11,590 Coalition-only patrols, 2,285 joint
patrols, 373 ﬂash checkpoints, and 905 static checkpoints. In all, up
to November 6, 2003, there had been 361 raids, 21,877 Coalitiononly patrols, 3,504 joint patrols, 2,653 static checkpoints, 1,919 ﬂash
checkpoints, and 843 ambushes.24
A Way Ahead?
One member of the CPA apparently has a sign hanging in his
ofﬁce which proclaims: “End State: A durable peace for a united and
stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and representative
government for and by the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new
and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; and no
longer poses a threat to its neighbours or international security and
is able to defend itself.”25 How that ambitious mission statement
might be achieved, of course, is the question, especially given the
need to reconcile a revived centralized authority with more local
forms of authority and the nature of the differing racial, religious,
and tribal communities in an artiﬁcial creation with no democratic
tradition such as Iraq. Much will depend upon the earliest possible
establishment of a government that enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of
a majority of Iraqis. In the meantime, however, the restoration of
law and order and the reduction of violence to an acceptable level
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will best help to create a situation in which stable government can
emerge and function. The emphasis upon an “acceptable level of
violence,” a phrase used by a British Home Secretary, Reginald
Maulding, to describe the government aim in Northern Ireland in
1971, is a deliberate one, given the potential for insurgencies to be
sustained over a considerable period of time.
It has been suggested above that the basic patterns of insurgency
have not changed materially, and, indeed, that there are similarities
between the emerging situation in Iraq and some earlier insurgencies
in the Middle East. It follows, therefore, that the essentials of
counterinsurgency also have remained fairly constant and that
the kind of basic requirements for success that can be identiﬁed in
campaigns since 1945 still hold good. These requirements are, ﬁrst,
a recognition of the need for a political rather than a purely military
response to insurgency; second, a need for coordination of the civil and
military response; third, a need for the coordination of intelligence;
fourth, a need to separate insurgents from the population; ﬁfth, a
need for the appropriate use of military force, which generally means
the minimum necessary in any given situation; and, last, the need to
implement long-term reform to address the grievances that led to
support for the insurgency in the ﬁrst place.26 These are as applicable
to offensive or defensive insurgency as to irregular conﬂicts falling
short of insurgency. Equally, they are as applicable to Iraq as they
were once to the British mandate in Palestine, or to Aden, Algeria,
and Oman. Where they were not adhered to, as in Palestine, Aden,
and Algeria, counterinsurgency failed; where it was, as in the Dhofar,
counterinsurgency succeeded.
Thus, in Palestine, Aden, and Algeria, the political response to
insurgency was weak. In Algeria, the French declined to address
Arab political and socio-economic aspirations through the belief
that it was part of metropolitan France: independence was not on
offer, and there was also a substantial European settler population.
In the case of Palestine and Aden, Labour governments were not
prepared to make the long-term commitment to law and order
required to demonstrate an intention to defeat insurgency. While
there was a reasonable degree of coordination of civil and military
response in Algeria, albeit with a heavy military inﬂuence, there
was frequently a mismatch of political and military objectives in
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Palestine and Aden. Intelligence in both Palestine and Aden was
exceedingly poor through insurgent inﬁltration of the police forces
and the obvious lack of long-term reward for cooperation with
British authorities soon to depart. In Algeria, of course, intelligence
was often obtained through institutionalized torture, where the
attempt to separate insurgents from population by the erection of
physical barriers and through large–scale resettlement also tended
to alienate the population rather than win hearts and minds. With
the population primarily in urban concentrations in Palestine and
Aden, it was not practicable to attempt resettlement, and attempts
to separate insurgent from population by means of propaganda was
notably unsuccessful. The heavy-handed French military approach
to operations in Algeria certainly resulted in the elimination of much
of the FLN by 1960, but military success could not be translated into
political success, given those other failings already outlined. British
military operations in Aden were more sophisticated than the crude
cordon and search methods used in Palestine but, again, military
success was of little account, given the political imperative to cut and
run.
In Oman, of course, as in other successful counterinsurgency
campaigns such as those in Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), and
Borneo (1962-66), the political response was eventually a measured
one, with clear political objectives articulated for the population,
with real incentives laid out for the maintenance of the status quo.
Coordination of the civil and military response was ensured through
a sophisticated committee structure, which embraced intelligence
services. A combination of physical and psychological measures
when combined with political incentives successfully isolated the
insurgents from the population, while the use of minimum force
ensured that the population was not alienated from the security
forces. Moreover, the incentives on offer had sufﬁcient long-term
promise in addressing political and other grievances to prevent any
recurrence of insurgency. Malaysia (embracing both Malaya and
Borneo) and Oman remain stable polities and, while hardly a shining
example of good governance, Kenya also has avoided much of the
bloodshed that has destabilized so many other post-independence
African states.
These are essentially British principles and, although there
have been failures―signiﬁcantly, mostly urban campaigns―the
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British army has been far more successful than most in combating
insurgency. While Middle Eastern examples have been stressed so
far, there are also lessons to be learned from the British experience
in tackling an organization which displays characteristics of both
an insurgent and a terrorist group. It has operated principally in
an urban environment but also in a rural environment, has enjoyed
refuge across an international frontier, and has manipulated the
situation within a deeply divided community. That experience, of
course, is that in Northern Ireland, a long-running threat since 1969
despite a supposed cease-ﬁre in effect since 1997. It can be noted that
the British army indeed has achieved an acceptable level of violence,
but with a substantially larger ratio of security forces to population
than is currently in Iraq. In Northern Ireland, it has been 20 per 1,000
inhabitants, whereas in Iraq, it is currently 6.1 per 1,000.27 There
was also a useful continuity and familiarity with operational areas
established through a system of some battalions serving long tours
and others shorter tours of 2.5 years and 6 months, respectively.
Some special forces were deployed in Northern Ireland and, most
certainly, as already indicated, in Dhofar, albeit in support of larger
conventional forces. It is not that long ago that Rod Paschall suggested
that counterinsurgency was so destructive of military “norms” that
it should be contracted out to private security organizations.28 To
some extent, there has been something of a privatization of certain
security roles in Iraq while, of course, U.S. and British special forces
are particularly involved in operations in Afghanistan, which seem,
arguably, atypically suited to them in collaboration with local
forces.29 An ongoing argument appears to be that counterinsurgency
should be the preserve of special forces, itself a reﬂection of a much
older debate in the U.S. military both before and after the Vietnam
experience. Equally, there has been an argument about the lack
of “light” infantry available initially for post-war stabilization
operations in Iraq. One should also be mindful that it is often the
case that the least sophisticated armies are the best practitioners of
counterinsurgency because lack of resources compel them to keep it
simple and engage principally at the same level as their opponents.
Indeed, as long ago as 1887, Charles Callwell rightly noted that, in
small wars, it was “the disciplined army that is obliged to conform to
the methods of those of adversaries inﬁnitely inferior in intelligence
and armament.”30
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This would suggest that, while there is a need for specialized
forces in some cases, and, on occasion, for heavier forces in
counterinsurgency, ideally there is a need for a force capable of
undertaking a variety of roles from within its own capabilities. It
also helps if there is a tradition of small wars experience on which to
draw. There is such tradition within the U.S. armed forces. Recently,
the Strategic Issues Research Institute has suggested that Charles
Gwynn’s Imperial Policing of 1934 be issued to U.S. forces.31 In many
ways, Gwynn’s work grew from that of Callwell in developing
principles for British counterinsurgency but notably without
taking any account of wider political issues. That was not a failing
of another text, which also drew its inspiration from Callwell and
which is more readily available to U.S. audiences, namely the two
editions of the Small Wars Manual of 1935 and 1940 developed by the
U.S. Marine Corps. For all that there are contradictions and some
major assumptions in the Small Wars Manual, it remains distinctly
useful for those facing the challenges of Iraq. Too often, conventional
armed forces have had to learn the same lessons over and over again
when the solutions have been within reach in their own past.
The scale of the problem may be far greater in Iraq than in past
Islamic and Middle Eastern insurgencies or, for that matter, the
Marine Corps experience in Central America and the Caribbean in
the 1920s and 1930s. The process may also be far longer, but the geostrategic prize is almost inestimable.
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